Anti-Muslim Prejudice When Exposed to News About Terrorism: The Roles of Negative Affect and Psychological Inflexibility by Hatton, Arthur T., Sr.
Georgia Southern University 
Digital Commons@Georgia Southern 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of 
Fall 2018 
Anti-Muslim Prejudice When Exposed to News About 
Terrorism: The Roles of Negative Affect and 
Psychological Inflexibility 
Arthur T. Hatton Sr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hatton, Arthur T. Sr., "Anti-Muslim Prejudice When Exposed to News About Terrorism: The 
Roles of Negative Affect and Psychological Inflexibility" (2018). Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations. 1607. 
https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd/1607 
This dissertation (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, 
Jack N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia 
Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu. 
ANTI-MUSLIM PREJUDICE WHEN EXPOSED TO NEWS ABOUT TERRORISM: THE 
ROLES OF NEGATIVE AFFECT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLEXIBILITY 
by 
ARTHUR T. HATTON 
(Under the Direction of Michael E. Nielsen) 
ABSTRACT 
In the United States, some proposed law enforcement policies intended to prevent 
terrorism may violate the civil rights of American minorities. These policies include random 
searches by law enforcement, banning Muslims from entering the country, and refusing to grant 
asylum to Syrian refugees. Additionally, the rise of ISIS has heightened the salience of terrorism 
across the world and in the United States. The goal of the high-production videos produced by 
ISIS may be partially intended to create inter-religious conflict in the West. My study examines 
the effect of news about ISIS propaganda videos on Americans’ opinions about policies that limit 
the civil rights of Muslims. I also examine one possible moderator of reactions to ISIS 
propaganda: psychological inflexibility. This psychological factor, developed from Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy, is a kind of behavioral reactivity to distressing events. I obtained two 
samples for this experiment: one student sample from a southeastern university, and a national 
sample of adults. Results showed that viewing ISIS propaganda raised negative affect in 
participants in both samples, did not increase support for anti-Muslim security policies, and 
psychological inflexibility did not play a role in this relationship. However, negative affect did 
play a role in predicting support for anti-Muslim policies. These results suggest support for anti-
Muslim security policies may be more influenced by negative affect than viewing any particular 
news story in the media. Future research may determine whether other measures of emotional 
reactivity may be predictive of reactions to terrorism portrayed in the media. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In a press release on December 7, 2015, echoing statements he made elsewhere, then 
GOP presidential front-runner Donald Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is 
going on” (Diamond, 2015). This statement, combined with previous statements by Trump 
supporting surveillance against mosques and establishing a database of Muslims in the country, 
seem to indicate a growing popular support for law enforcement profiling of certain groups in the 
United States based on religion, a proposal condemned by the Obama administration, Homeland 
Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, and even many members of Trump’s own party as 
unconstitutional and dangerous. Several of Trump’s fellow Republican candidates suggested 
similar bans not based on religion but on country of origin (Diamond, 2015). 
Despite the debate over the constitutionality of blanket restrictions imposed by the 
Federal government on the basis of religion, Trump’s position did not seem to harm his political 
ambitions. In fact, by May of 2016 Trump’s remaining rivals in the GOP race had formally 
withdrawn their candidacy, and Trump’s continued statements casting Muslims as security 
threats to the United States seem only to empower his supporters. According to a Pew Research 
Center poll from March of 2016, 64% of Trump supporters agreed that U.S. Muslims should be 
subject to more scrutiny because of their religion, compared to 33% of all voters (Pew Research 
Center, 2016).  
The political fight over admitting Syrian refugees into the U.S. did not begin with Donald 
Trump. In June of 2015, a hearing before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 
Intelligence, part of the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of 
Representatives, addressed the growing concern of admitting refugees into the U.S. from the 
surging crisis resulting from the Syrian Civil War. At the forefront of concerns was the 
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possibility that, among those fleeing legitimately for their own safety, there were terrorists from 
extremist Islamic groups, including ISIS, using the situation to plant themselves surreptitiously 
into Western countries. Representatives cited the lack of clear intelligence in a quickly-changing 
environment and some precedent in terrorists using such crises to their advantage as evidence 
that the refugee program, with relation to the Syrian refugees, needed to be re-evaluated or even 
“paused,” while others noted that a restructuring of the refugee program undermines its 
humanitarian raison d'être without clear guarantees that it would make the country safer 
(Admitting Syrian Refugees, 2015). Notably, a statement from the Syrian Community Network 
from Chicago, Illinois at that hearing contained the following: 
The families and individuals being considered for resettlement face dire protection 
challenges and often need specialized care. Among those being considered are victims of 
torture, women at risk, persons with disabilities, LGBTQ persons facing risk, women-
headed households, and those facing acute security threats. To prohibit Syrian refugees 
from the option of U.S. resettlement because of the presence of ISIL and other extremist 
groups in Syria, and not based on thorough U.S.-led security checks and humanitarian 
needs assessments, discounts the commendable work of the Department of Homeland 
Security and Department of State and amounts to blatant discrimination based on 
nationality. (p. 34) 
As the conflict in Syria heated up and ISIS grew in influence, power, and control of land 
and resources, governmental bodies in the United States continued to debate the refugee 
admission system as it relates to security. In January of 2016, some members of Congress and 
the House of Representatives suggested that the safest solution was to categorically refuse 
refugees from Iraq and Syria from resettlement in the United States (Collins et al., 2016). 
9 
 
Additionally, governors from a number of states publically opposed the resettlement of Syrian 
refugees within their own states, and some began fighting in the legal system for the right to 
refuse refugees (Sakuma, 2016).  
Despite vows by the Obama administration for the United States to pick up its share of 
refugees to ease the Syrian crisis, as of April of 2016, the United States government had only 
settled 13% of the refugees it had pledged to take in, a total of just over 1,200 (Sakuma, 2016). 
By way of comparison, by February 3, 2016, the vast majority of Syrian refugees had been 
resettled in neighboring countries: Turkey (2.5 million), Lebanon (1.1 million), Jordan (over 
600,000), Iraq (4 million displaced internally and over 200,000 from neighboring Syria), and 
Egypt (over 100,000), while the EU has resettled just under 100,000, representing one-fifth of 
those currently crossing into Europe from the Syrian conflict (Amnesty International, 2016). In 
an editorial for Scientific American, anthropologist Krystal D’Costa argued that the United 
States’ hesitance to resettle even the small number of refugees the Obama administration has 
pledged to help may be a reflection of not just a bureaucratic failure but something more nuanced 
and sinister: an intentional act of prejudice and discrimination against Muslims, buried in a code 
of language citing safety, feigning empathy, and treating Syrians, particularly Muslim Syrians, as 
a suspicious Other (D’Costa, 2015). 
 To more fully understand support for law enforcement and security policies that profile 
Muslims, psychology may play a unique role. Those who support these policies cite safety and 
security as their primary motivations, not racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice. Yet, the proposed 
solutions to the threat of terrorism seem to target particular religious and ethnic groups. 
Therefore, the intersection between psychological factors such as out-group prejudice, 
perceptions of safety and threat, and support for various security policies ought to be more fully 
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examined, especially in light of the various groups and candidates who may benefit from 
leveraging these psychological forces. 
 Terrorist groups such as ISIS may be a greater beneficiary of this kind of rhetoric than 
Donald Trump. ISIS in particular has made a name for itself, not only due to its rapid expansion 
and conquest of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, but also for its violent cruelty, 
especially featured in its high-production-quality propaganda videos. The goals of ISIS’s 
propaganda machine are seemingly complex and nuanced, but one of the strongest goals appears 
to be recruitment (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). A number of commentators, 
including Trump’s Democratic rival, Hillary Clinton, suggest that Trump’s rhetoric and anti-
Muslim policies actually help ISIS recruitment by confirming international Muslim’s fears that 
the United States is systematically biased against Muslims as a whole (Merica, 2015). Though 
Donald Trump demanded an apology from Clinton for those remarks, in 2016, both Al-Shabaab 
(an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia) and ISIS released recruitment videos depicting Donald 
Trump, with Al-Shabaab’s video specifically citing Trump as evidence that America is a “racist 
nation that will turn against its Muslim citizens” (Schatz, 2016). If it is true that one of the 
purposes of ISIS terrorism is to provoke an anti-Muslim reaction in the United States in order to 
enhance recruitment into its own organization, then it is vital to examine whether their 
propaganda succeeds in these goals. Because ISIS propaganda videos have been reported on in a 
wide variety of traditional and online news outlets, a full understanding of the purpose and the 
effects of these videos is highly needed. 
 While there has been only a short time to examine the psychological effects of ISIS 
propaganda on opinions of security policies that profile Muslims, and the traits that might 
influence this connection, some theoretical directions have been suggested. In an editorial in the 
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Huffington Post, Steven C. Hayes, the founder of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, 
suggested that the rise of Donald Trump may be partially the result of a construct called 
psychological inflexibility (Hayes, 2016). In that article, Hayes suggested that psychological 
inflexibility makes a unique contribution to generalized prejudice, which Hayes defines as a 
“kind of authoritarian distancing” toward people who are deemed to be a threat. There has been 
some evidence that psychological inflexibility is implicated in prejudice (Levin, Luoma, 
Vilardaga, Lillis, Nobles, & Hayes, 2015), however, its role in reactions to terrorism and terrorist 
propaganda, as well as support for profiling against Muslims, has not yet been studied 
empirically. A full understanding of what psychological inflexibility is, how it may be 
theoretically implicated in general prejudice and prejudice toward Muslims, whether it is related 
to people’s reactions to ISIS terrorist propaganda, and whether it matters in a context of national 
security and law enforcement policy would make a strong contribution to the current social and 
political discourse on these issues. Uncovering possible connections with these topics may help 
the media, politicians, policymakers, and public figures to be mindful of their rhetoric and 
understand possible side effects of their framing of terrorism. Additionally, it may aid in crafting 
interventions that could buffer the effects of terrorist events on the public. Reducing the power of 
terrorism to generate a counter-reaction in the public may decrease one incentive for committing 
terrorist acts. 
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CHAPER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Feelings toward Muslims 
 From 1990 to 2008, Muslims were disproportionately discriminated against, compared to 
other religious minorities, in Western countries (Fox & Akbaba, 2015). This discrimination can 
be seen in both emotional antipathy toward Muslims and groups that are seen as related, such as 
Arabs, Middle Easterners, and even Sikhs. Even before the attacks on the Twin Towers on 
September 11, 2001, Arabs were often portrayed as supportive of terrorism, violent, and 
deceptive in film and media (Johnson, 1992). In a study conducted by the Arab American 
Institute in 2014, 27% of a large sample of Americans endorsed “favorable” opinions toward 
Muslims, but 45% endorsed having “unfavorable” ratings, giving Muslims the lowest 
“favorable” ratings of any major religious group in the United States (Arab American Institute, 
2014). In that same study, 42% of the sample endorsed law enforcement profiling of Arab 
Americans or Muslim Americans. Similar attitudes have been found in Europe, where polled 
respondents endorsed unfavorable attitudes toward Muslims at rates that exceed those in the 
United States, such as 63% in Italy, 53% in Greece, 50% in Poland, and 46% in Spain (Stokes & 
Oates, 2014). 
After September 11, 2001, some have suggested that this counter-reaction to Islamic 
extremism has had both political and social consequences for all Muslims, regardless of their 
views toward terrorism or affiliation with terrorist groups (Pratt, 2015). Research suggests that 
the backlash of hate speech and violence against Muslims after 9/11 has slowed the rate of 
Muslim assimilation in the United States, resulting in American Muslims having higher rates of 
marriage within their own community, higher birth rates, lower female labor force participation, 
and lower English proficiency (Gould & Klor, 2014). Discrimination often takes the form of 
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support for security policies that unfairly target Muslims, such as through racial, ethnic, and 
religious profiling (Ward, 2001), as well as general social policies that seem to target anything 
Islamic. For instance, in Europe, laws have been passed that limit the building of minarets and 
the wearing of headscarves (Pratt, 2015). In 2006 conservative television host Mike Gallagher on 
“Dayside,” a Fox News show, suggested airport security should have a “Muslims-only” line 
(Judy, 2006). Empirical research suggests that hate crimes against Muslims as well as Asians 
increased dramatically after 9/11 as well as the 7/7 attack in London in July of 2005, both events 
of which were highly reported on in traditional news media (Hanes & Machin, 2014). 
Furthermore, hate speech against Muslims not only occurs on the “street level” but on websites 
and social media such as Facebook and Twitter as well (Awan, 2014). Thus, the actions of 
extremists who profess Islam as their inspiration, and popular-level support for discrimination 
against Muslims may be a bidirectional process occurring with both social and traditional media 
as intermediaries. 
The Goals of Terrorism 
Violent terrorism is intended to accomplish specific goals and can be compared to a type 
of theater or “spectacle” intended to provoke a response (Cowen, 2006). In a modern world with 
a 24-hour news cycle saturating television, newspapers, magazines, social media, and the 
Internet, the spectacle of terrorism plays out on the stage in people’s homes via televisions and 
computers. In other words, the function of terrorism is not dissimilar from other “cultural 
spectacles,” such as a 4th of July parade or the Roman Empire’s numerous, often violent, circus 
games. 
 Several previous studies sought to understand how extremist content is disseminated and 
what effects it has on recruitment into extremist and terrorist organizations as well as on violent 
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actions. For instance, a report by the RAND Corporation (2013) sought to examine the role of 
extremist Internet outlets on the radicalization of terrorists and extremists in the United 
Kingdom. That report suggests that extremist content released onto the Internet may not have the 
average person in mind as an audience, but instead may be seeking recruits among those who are 
already sympathetic to their causes (von Behr, Reding, Edwards, & Gribbon, 2013). In other 
words, these outlets are not intended to radicalize someone who is not sympathetic to extremism 
at all to begin with, but rather to find and recruit sympathetic audiences who use that content to 
radicalize further and possibly justify taking violent or destructive action in line with their radical 
beliefs. 
ISIS is not the only organization known to spread extremist content online. On June 17 of 
2015, a gunman, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, burst into a historically black church in Charleston, 
South Carolina and shot and killed nine church members and non-fatally injured a tenth. Roof 
had previously released a manifesto online detailing his racist views and his hope that his 
actions, presumably the shootings on June 17th, would incite a race war in the United States 
(Robles, 2015). 
 After Roof was captured, many political and popular discussions were ignited. One of the 
controversies in the case of Dylann Roof was the role of the right-wing propaganda he sought out 
online as a means of radicalizing Roof and his actions. In particular, Roof’s manifesto mentioned 
the website of a right-wing white supremacist group called the “Council of Conservative 
Citizens” (Robles, 2015). The CCC’s website features racist views such as “God is the author of 
racism…. Mixing the races is rebelliousness against God,” opposition toward immigration of 
non-white people into the United States, black people are a “retrograde species of humanity,” 
and white culture in the United States is on the decline (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). 
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Roof specifically credited the extremist content in that website as partial inspiration for his 
violent actions. 
 It is not clear whether terrorists are “rational in the economic sense” (Cowen, 2006), 
suggesting terrorists, especially terrorists motivated by religious incentives, do not necessarily 
respond to “secular” incentives or adjust to real-world changes in cost or benefit. Therefore, we 
may not expect that terrorists would respond based on success, or lack of success, in achieving 
some short-term political goal. Nevertheless, if we assume that at least some of the motivation of 
terrorism is rational, we may also consider the question of whether terrorism is successful in 
achieving its aims. The answer to this question depends on what the stated goals are. On the one 
hand, political scientist Max Abrahms argued if the goal of terrorism is to gain political 
concessions from nation-states, then terrorism in the modern era is not very successful (2006). 
However, Abrahms made this argument before the rise of, arguably, the most successful terrorist 
organization in modern history, ISIS. Although this organization has not successfully used its 
violent terrorist propaganda to gain political concessions, some estimates of ISIS manpower are 
as high as 200,000 as of November 2015, suggesting recruitment methods are effective 
(Cockburn, 2015). 
 ISIS videos tend to follow a certain pattern of dissemination: they are first released from 
“official” social media accounts to a complex web of thousands of pro-ISIS social media outlets 
who then spread these videos generally to the public (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Social media 
websites such as Twitter have suspended a large number of pro-ISIS accounts for the purpose of 
limiting ISIS’s influence and research suggests that this strategy helps curtail ISIS online 
network’s ability to spread (Berger & Morgan, 2015). However, news outlets have reported on 
ISIS videos and published detailed descriptions of their contents, particularly still frame pictures. 
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For example, news outlets reported heavily on the November 2015 attacks in Beirut and Paris, 
broadcasting images of the chaos ensued after the attacks took place. The reporting of these 
attacks, as well as official ISIS propaganda films, may have an unspecified number of both 
intentional and unintentional effects among those exposed to them.  
News Broadcasting and Well-Being 
 Research suggests that news broadcasting of tragic or violent news stories, particularly 
those involving war and terrorism, can influence mental health. For instance, following the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, a large sample of middle-school students in Oklahoma City were 
surveyed regarding their mental health symptoms. It was hypothesized that the tremendous 
amount of news coverage following the incident may have increased symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress in local children. That study found that greater television exposure was associated with 
higher post-traumatic stress seven weeks after the bombing, even among those with no emotional 
or physical exposure to the bombing (Pfefferbaum, Nixon, Doughty, Pynoos, Gurwitch, & Foy, 
2001). 
 Another body of similar psychological research emerged in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11. One study found that post-traumatic stress among New Yorkers was similar across those 
who had been directly exposed to the event and those who had not (Galea & Resnick, 2005), 
though follow-up research indicates that those exposed to the event had significantly higher 
symptoms over time (Neria, DiGrande, & Adams, 2011). This would suggest that secondary 
symptoms among the general population after a terrorist event may be minimal. However, 
research has also shown that televised trauma may increase anxiety, especially among children 
and adolescents (Pfefferbaum et al., 2001), and this suggests that media exposure may mediate 
the relationship between terrorist events and possible symptoms in the general population. For 
17 
 
instance, one study found that post-traumatic symptoms in adolescents from Boston were partly 
predicted by media exposure following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings (Busso, 
McLaughlin, & Sheridan, 2014). 
 A more recent article found evidence that news consumption increases as the result of 
major wartime events and that an increased frequency of exposure to these newscasts results in a 
number of negative mental health outcomes (Bodas, Siman-Tov, Peleg, & Solomon, 2015). This 
study was done on a sample in Israel following Operation Protective Edge, a military operation 
launched by Israel against targets in the Gaza strip in July of 2014. During that operation, Israeli 
media broadcasted news regarding the conflict around the clock, and 76% of the sample of the 
study reported an increase in news media consumption. A majority of the viewers in the sample, 
70%, reported that the newscasts were stressful but that they would not avoid watching them. A 
majority of the sample reported that the urge to watch the newscasts was “burdensome,” but that 
they are also “addictive.” A majority also reported that they watched the newscasts out of fear of 
missing important information (Bodas, Siman-Tov, Peleg, & Solomon, 2015). The researchers 
also surveyed their sample regarding mental health symptoms and examined how these increased 
during Operation Protective Edge. Members of the sample who watched the newscasts reported 
the following symptoms while viewing the newscasts: physiological hyperstimulation (12.8%), a 
sense of uncontrolled fear or anxiety (18.4%), sleeping difficulties (22.3%), and fearful thoughts 
(36.6%). The researchers reported that it was impossible to conclude that watching the 
newscasts, as opposed to the general wartime climate, was associated with significant increases 
in these symptoms due to the fact that their sample did not have enough participants who did not 
watch the newscasts – watching the newscasts was almost completely pervasive among their 
sample (Bodas, Siman-Tov, Peleg, & Solomon, 2015). 
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 Therefore, violent and distressing news does not have uniform effects across all 
individuals. Instead, there are individual factors that determine reactions to news stories. More 
research has sought to identify mediating and moderating variables between news exposure and 
mental health variables. One study showed that two predictors of post-traumatic symptoms in 
children after the Boston Marathon bombings were media exposure and nervous system 
reactivity, suggesting a role of unwanted physiological reactions as a result of terrorism exposure 
(Busso, McLaughlin, & Sheridan, 2014). Reactivity to unwanted physiological reactions may 
also play a role in how people react to terrorism. One study found that media exposure and trait 
anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, was predictive of the hyperarousal 
and re-experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among undergraduate 
students in Ontario following 9/11. On the other hand, it was anxiety sensitivity that predicted 
avoidance behaviors and overall PTSD symptoms (Collimore, McCabe, Carleton, & Asmundson, 
2008). Anxiety sensitivity is a construct defined as a fear of anxiety or anxious symptoms due to 
the belief that it will have harmful consequences (Reiss & McNally, 1985). 
 Possibly, any connection between exposure to depictions of terrorism perpetrated by 
Muslims and prejudice against Muslims may be explained through similar mechanisms. Studies 
that identify relationships between exposure to terrorism- or war-related news stories, 
psychological variables, and prejudice against Muslims have been sparse. One study examined 
whether or not the phrase “War on Terror” increased prejudice in the aftermath of the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombings. Usage of the phrase “War on Terror” increased in the heavy news 
coverage following the bombings, but priming participants with a “War on Terror” frame did not 
increase mortality salience or prejudice (Hatton, 2013). To the contrary, it was found that the 
phrase significantly decreased support for security policies that unfairly target Muslims. 
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However, the author noted that it is possible that priming participants with Federal involvement 
may trigger a decrease in support for any government intervention in a sample of conservative 
Southern students due to a general distrust of government (Hatton, 2013). 
 To follow up on that study, Hatton and Nielsen (2016) collected data on reactions to ISIS 
videos in the fall of 2014 in order to determine whether exposure to ISIS propaganda videos 
interacted with a differential effect of framing the “War on Terror” at the Federal or community 
level. On February 15, 2015, ISIS released a video depicting the beheading of 21 Egyptian 
Coptic Christians. This video had a number of unique aspects that may have influenced the 
American public differently than the previous videos. First, it depicted a larger scale of 
executions than many other videos (21 victims). Second, the victims were targeted solely due to 
their Christian religion and the video was addressed to “people of the cross” in the Coptic 
Church and in Rome. Third, the video had wide coverage by Christian and secular online media, 
including Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant media, many of which heavily emphasized the 
religiously-motivated nature of the executions (Casper, 2015; Catholic News Service, 2015; 
Orthodox Christian News, 2015), resulting in a heavy spread of dissemination through social 
media. Such a bold statement toward Christianity may have brought the conflict into people's 
back yards, so to speak. Because of the possible effect this video may have had on people’s 
opinions about Muslims, a second wave of data collection was added to the study soon after the 
release of this video (Hatton & Nielsen, 2016). In that study, it was found that after the video 
depicting the execution of 21 Egyptian Christians, participants were significantly more 
supportive of security policies that unfairly target Muslims when the “War on Terror” was 
framed at the community level as opposed to the Federal level. 
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 That study suggested two interacting influences on reactions to ISIS terrorist propaganda, 
both dealing with the perceived “closeness” that viewers felt toward the victims in the videos. 
First, the video released in February depicted a large group of Christians being targeted solely for 
their religious affiliation. The release of this video may have increased the reaction in the largely 
Christian sample. Second, there was a larger effect when participants were primed to think of the 
“War on Terror” happening on the proximal community level as opposed to the distal Federal 
level. These two interacting effects resulted in significantly higher support for prejudicial 
security policies aimed at curbing terrorism in the United States. 
 A group of researchers examined the link between exposure to terrorism news and 
prejudice through the lens of Terror Management Theory (TMT), which theorizes that exposure 
to stimuli that remind people of mortality and death results in attempts to avoid those thoughts 
through worldviews that give people a sense of permanence, or attempts to bolster self-esteem. 
Because previous research links mortality salience and prejudice, this seems to be a natural 
connection (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009). The researchers conducted 
the study by exposing participants to either news about Islamic terrorism or a control news story. 
Those in the terrorism condition had an increase in death-related thoughts, which then predicted 
prejudiced attitudes against Muslims. If these findings are replicable it may suggest that news 
depicting Islamic terrorism increases prejudice against Muslims and that the relationship may be 
explained by mortality anxiety. However, Hatton (2013) failed to find a connection between 
usage of the phrase “War on Terror” immediately after the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and 
mortality salience. 
 If exposure to news or stimuli related to terrorism does not increase anti-Muslim 
prejudice through mortality salience, then we are left searching for other mechanisms. The 
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research implicating anxiety sensitivity in mental health outcomes when people are exposed to 
distressing, terrorism-related stimuli suggests that anxiety-related systems are activated during 
that exposure. If connections between affect-related variables and prejudice can be made, this 
may go toward explaining the relationship between depictions of terrorism in the media and 
prejudiced reactions. 
 We are then left to evaluate Hayes’ claim that psychological inflexibility may be 
implicated in recent events as well as reactions to news about terrorism (Hayes, 2016). The 
researchers who first proposed the existence of psychological inflexibility call it the epicenter of 
human suffering, and defined it as the combination of behavioral patterns of effortful avoidance 
intended to reduce or eliminate unwanted internal and external experiences, combined with the 
rigid adherence to literal content of thoughts (Hayes et al., 2006). It is similar to anxiety 
sensitivity in that it describes a certain reactivity toward internal distress, though it differs in 
significant ways. First, it describes reactivity toward a wide range of distressing internal 
experiences, not just anxiety. Second, it focuses on behavioral avoidance, including cognitive 
and behavioral strategies intended to down-regulate internal distress. Third, it has been linked in 
the literature to prejudice (Levin et al., 2015). 
The Psychological Flexibility Model 
 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), the clinical theoretical system from which 
psychological inflexibility emerged, identifies six core cognitive and behavioral processes that 
are linked to mental health. Acceptance is the embrace of unwanted experiences, including 
thoughts and emotions, without attempts to force them away or change them. Cognitive defusion 
is the process of changing the relationship to one’s thoughts, rather than their content or form, 
such that their functions are diminished. Being present is the process of mindfully allowing one’s 
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self to experience events non-judgmentally as they occur. Self-as-context is the process of 
viewing one’s self as the transcendent context upon which thoughts, events, and behaviors tend 
to occur. Values are the over-arching patterns of behavior that are good for a person in the long-
term. Committed action is the process of developing meaningful behaviors that help a person 
more fully move toward values (Hayes et al., 2006). According to this model, all six processes 
working together are termed psychological flexibility: a description of the willingness to 
experience unwanted internal events without allowing them to influence behavior. 
 The opposite of psychological flexibility is called psychological inflexibility. 
Psychological flexibility has been found to be negatively correlated with psychological 
inflexibility, but individuals can score high or low on both traits (Bond et al., 2011). Behaviors 
intended to reduce unwanted internal experience can be external, in the case of outward 
behavioral avoidance of triggers, environments, stimuli, places, etc. that are associated with 
negative experiences, or they can be internal, in the case of often repetitive cognitive patterns or 
processes intended to “push away” or “fight against” those experiences. The downside to 
avoidance behaviors, called experiential avoidance, is that, although they serve to help a person 
achieve the goal of emotional down-regulation in the short-term, long-term valued behaviors are 
avoided and distress and other mental health symptoms are increased. Relatedly, attempts at 
suppressing unwanted or distressing cognitions can paradoxically result in increases in the very 
cognitions a person is trying to avoid (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). One common ACT metaphor 
to illustrate this principle is that of a bus driver with a bus full of loud, aggressive passengers 
(Hayes et al., 2006). One strategy to calm passengers would be for the driver to pull over the bus 
and yell at them. This strategy may be effective in the short term, but ultimately the driver’s 
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whole purpose is to drive the bus to a certain destination, and stopping to yell at the passengers is 
only a short-term solution that does not ultimately aid in the goal. 
According to ACT theory, a psychologically flexible person is more willing to tolerate 
emotional and cognitive discomfort in the short term by fully contacting the present moment 
without psychological defensiveness to pursue valued long-term behavioral directions (Bond et 
al., 2011). Paradoxically, letting go of attempts to control or avoid unwanted internal experience 
should result in reductions in those experiences. 
 In support of this theory, psychological inflexibility and experiential avoidance have been 
linked to a number of negative mental health symptoms. High psychological inflexibility has 
been linked to distress in a wide range of areas, such as depression, anxiety, stress, general health 
symptoms, and even higher absences from work (Bond et al., 2011). High psychological 
inflexibility has also been implicated in high anxiety sensitivity and pathological worry (Ruiz, 
2014). The link between psychological inflexibility and maladaptive coping as well as mental 
health symptoms has even been seen in a number of samples across the world, including Spain 
(Ruiz, Herrera, Luciano, Cangas, & Beltran, 2013), the Netherlands (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2008), 
Asian Americans (Dosheen & Hayes, 2010), Korean-born American adoptees (Sarubbi, Block-
Lerner, Moon, & Williams, 2012), and among Chinese students and athletes in Hong Kong 
(Zhang, Chung, Si, & Liu, 2014). This lends credence to the theory that psychological 
inflexibility, which is based on universal principles of conditioning and learning, exists across 
cultures. 
Psychological Inflexibility and Prejudice 
 Psychological inflexibility has been implicated in prejudice, stigma, and discrimination, 
because these constructs share cognitive roots in classical and operant conditioning, 
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overgeneralizing, and categorizing. Because these are basic cognitive processes, prejudice 
toward outgroups, including people of different religions, races, ethnicities, cultural 
backgrounds, social classes, etc. is common across societies. Even those who deny prejudiced 
attitudes often maintain unconscious or automatic biases (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & 
Banaji, 2009). Theories of psychological inflexibility predict that people who experience 
negative emotions or cognitions as the result of thinking about or encountering members of 
stigmatized out-groups, and who are also psychologically inflexible, will engage in additional 
behaviors, control strategies, or experiential avoidance to down-regulate those experiences 
(Levin et al., 2015). These behaviors may include avoidance of out-group members, refusal to 
hire someone of a different ethnic or cultural background, behaviors aimed at driving out a 
member of a community, support for laws and policies that marginalize out-group members, and 
even violence toward out-group members. Additionally, inflexibility may mediate the 
relationship between self-concealment and psychological distress in the victims of prejudice 
(Leleux-Labarge, Hatton, Goodnight, & Masuda, 2015). 
A recently proposed model based on both ACT and RFT called the Flexible 
Connectedness Model seeks to predict and, possibly, influence a number of maladaptive or 
harmful social processes by proposing that prejudice can be viewed as a deficit in three 
independent factors: low empathic concern for others, low ability to take the perspective of 
others, and high psychological inflexibility (Vilardaga, Estevez, Levin, & Hayes, 2012). 
Vilardaga et al. (2012) suggested that deficits in these factors may also predict social anhedonia, 
or a lack of interest in social activities or close contact with others. In a study of students at a 
Spanish university, 26% of the variance in social anhedonia was predicted by these three factors, 
working independently, and of these, experiential avoidance was the strongest factor (Vilardaga, 
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Estevez, Levin, & Hayes, 2012). A follow-up study examined the relationship between 
psychological inflexibility, perspective taking, and empathic concern with generalized prejudice 
(Levin et al., 2015). The concept of generalized prejudice emerged from the finding that 
prejudice against one target group is often highly correlated with prejudice against many target 
groups (McFarland, 2010). In the Levin et al. study (2015), generalized prejudice was examined 
by combining measures of racism toward African Americans, obese individuals, gay men, 
women, and substance abusers, and generating a scale based on the contribution of all those 
factors. Psychological inflexibility was significantly positively correlated with generalized 
prejudice (r = .28) (Levin et al., 2015).  
 This research on prejudice and psychological inflexibility is notable because it not only 
identifies significant factors that predict prejudice but suggests possible interventions to reduce 
that prejudice in the form of clinical techniques developed to reduce psychological flexibility and 
experiential avoidance (Masuda, Hill, Morgan, & Cohen, 2012). Although research on this topic 
is still in its infancy, a number of studies suggest connections between interventions to decrease 
psychological inflexibility and the reductions of both prejudice and the effects of prejudice. One 
pilot study compared the effectiveness of two classroom interventions on positive behaviors to 
overcome racial boundaries. One intervention was a more “traditional” prejudice-awareness 
training intended to educate students on prejudice and how to overcome prejudice. The other 
intervention educated students on ACT theory regarding how psychological inflexibility may 
contribute to prejudice. The study found that the ACT intervention was more effective in 
increasing prosocial and prejudice-reducing behaviors at follow-up one week later (Lillis & 
Hayes, 2007). Another study found that ACT interventions were successful in reducing 
stigmatizing attitudes against people with a mental disorder (Masuda et al., 2007). Increasing 
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psychological flexibility has also been linked to decreasing stigma directed at one’s self. One 
study found that an ACT workshop successfully reduced self-stigma of weight-related thoughts 
in those in a weight-loss program (Lillis, Hayes, Bunting, and Masuda, 2009). Another study 
found that an ACT workshop reduced self-stigma among patients with substance use difficulties 
(Luoma, Kohlenberg, Hayes, & Fletcher, 2012). 
Empirical Directions 
 Combining the research on psychological inflexibility and prejudice with a political and 
social backlash against Muslims suggests a line of empirical predictions. Possibly, the prejudicial 
backlash against Muslims, in the form of violence, hate speech, and support for policies that limit 
the civil rights and influence of Muslims in the public sphere may be partly the result of 
psychological inflexibility: the trauma and discomfort generated by the original event may result 
in behaviors intended to reduce that discomfort. In this case, stigmatizing acts intended to limit 
Muslim influence may be attempts to increase one’s own feelings of safety and security. 
Typically, information about terrorism comes through news media outlets. These may include 
Internet, social media, broadcast and cable television news, newspapers, and magazines. As such, 
it may be possible to view news articles or segments about terrorist events as primes that can 
measurably cause discomfort and prejudice regarding Muslims. This would suggest that it may 
be possible to predict a person’s cognitive, affective, or behavioral responses to news about 
terrorism based on that person’s levels of psychological inflexibility.  
Current Study 
The connections between prejudice as the result of terrorist media exposure and the role 
of psychological inflexibility have not been fully examined in the empirical literature. The 
attacks that occurred in November 2015 may provide stimuli to be used to test the effects of 
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terrorist attacks presented in video media, in this case, news reports. Because there were two 
similar attacks at roughly the same time, this allows predictions to be made regarding reactions 
to the news based on perceived closeness to the victims of the attacks. After both attacks took 
place, commenters made note that the attacks in Paris garnered a level of sympathy in Western 
media that was not given to the attacks in Beirut (Barnard, 2015). Based on the proposed 
connections between psychological inflexibility, terrorist media exposure, and prejudice, I have 
constructed a model depicting the relationships between these variables. This model is depicted 
in Figure 1.  
Preliminary Hypothesis: Viewing a news story depicting an incident of ISIS terrorist 
propaganda will increase negative affect. 
Hypothesis 1: Viewing a video depicting a disturbing incident of terrorism will increase 
anti-Muslim prejudice in the form of support for law enforcement and security policies that 
profile Muslims, compared to viewing videos depicting either distressing, non-terrorist-related 
news or neutral news. 
Hypothesis 2: Psychological inflexibility will moderate the relationship between an 
increase in negative affect resulting from exposure to news about terrorism and support for 
Muslim profiling by law enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Pilot Study 
My study first hinges on the hypothesis that news stories depicting ISIS propaganda are 
emotionally distressing. To confirm this effect, I measured changes in negative affect in 
participants who viewed a CNN news broadcast of an ISIS propaganda film.  
Participants. We recruited 69 undergraduate students (29 male, 40 female) at a rural 
southeastern university in the United States to participate in a study for course credit. The mean 
age of the students was 20.3 (SEM = .45). 
Materials and Measures. 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS is a 20-item measure 
of both positive and negative state affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It has been shown 
to be internally consistent, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .86 to .90 for the Positive Affect 
subscale and .84 to .87 for the Negative Affect subscale. It consists of 20 emotion words, such as 
“afraid” and “interested,” that represent positive or negative affect, and respondents are asked to 
indicate on a 1-5 Likert-type scale to what degree the respondent has felt that way in the 
indicated time frame, which can range from the present moment to the past year (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988). We presented the PANAS twice, with the first PANAS asking participants to 
“Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment,” and the 
second PANAS asking, “After having watched the video, please indicate how you are feeling 
now, that is, at the present moment.”  
I selected two CNN news broadcasts to include in this study. Possibly, any change in 
support for anti-Muslim prejudicial policies from viewing an ISIS news story may be the result 
of an increase in negative affect, regardless of whether the video depicts terrorists who claim 
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Islam as their motivation. To examine this possibility, I also included a video that depicts a 
distressing news story that is unrelated to terrorism perpetrated by Muslims. The videos were 
chosen from the same news service, CNN, to eliminate possible news service-specific reactions, 
and were roughly the same duration. The two videos were: 
1. Mass beheading video: “ISIS posts video of purported mass beheading,” a video clip 
featured on CNN on February 15, 2015 reporting on an ISIS propaganda film 
depicting the execution of 21 Egyptian Christians. The video is located on CNN’s 
official YouTube channel at  https://youtu.be/uzNfN21ye6I. 
2.  James Holmes video: “Witnesses give emotional testimony in James Holmes trial” – 
a video clip featured on CNN on May 4, 2015 reporting on witnesses giving 
testimony at the trial of the Aurora theater shooter, James Holmes. The video is 
located on CNN’s official YouTube channel at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1p7z57gqWrE. 
Demographics. Demographic questions asked included age, sex, frequency of church 
attendance (1-5 Likert-type scale, with 1 = “every week or nearly every week,” 2 = “most 
weeks,” 3 = “occasionally,” 4 = “rarely,” and 5 = “never”), liberal vs. conservative (1-7 Likert-
type scale, with 1 = “very liberal,” 2 = “liberal,” 3 = “slightly liberal,” 4 = “moderate,” 5 = 
“slightly conservative,” 6 = “conservative,” and 7 = “very conservative), and whether they or a 
person close to them had served in law enforcement or the military (1 = “yes,” 2 = “no”). 
Procedure. After receiving an informed consent document, students received a PANAS 
and were instructed to fill it out according to how they were presently feeling. After clicking 
next, students were randomly shown a video via an embedded YouTube window and were 
instructed to view the video. Then, students were instructed to complete the PANAS again to 
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indicate how they were feeling after viewing the video. After the second PANAS, students filled 
out the demographic questions and were debriefed. 
Main Study 
Participants. Two samples were obtained for this study, an online sample, and a student 
sample. The student sample consisted of 465 undergraduate students (216 male, 245 female, 4 no 
sex reported, mean age 20.37) from a rural southeastern university in the United States. The 
online sample consisted of 435 workers (206 male, 226 female, 3 no sex reported, mean age 
37.88) recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, a website that provides survey respondents for 
research. Mechanical Turk respondents were reimbursed $0.40 each for their participation in the 
survey.  
Materials and Measures. 
The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II). The AAQ-II was developed as 
a brief measure of psychological inflexibility (Bond et al., 2011). It has been shown to be 
internally consistent in previous research (Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .78 to .88). The 
measure includes 7 items consisting of statements that represent an unwillingness to experience 
unwanted thoughts and feelings, such as “I’m afraid of my feelings,” and “My painful memories 
prevent me from having a fulfilling life” (Bond et al., 2011). Respondents answer on a 1-7 Likert 
scale with 1 representing “never true,” and 7 representing “always true.” 
Videos. The same two videos were shown as in the pilot study, with the addition of one 
neutral video that served as a control. The control video is entitled “First Nobel Prize of teaching 
winner speaks,” and it depicts a teacher who won an award for excellence in teaching. The video 
is located on the CNN official YouTube Channel at https://youtu.be/tR_qW6IuXv0.  
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Support for security policies. Six policy questions were included from previous research 
on support for security policies that unfairly target Muslims and Middle Easterners (Hatton & 
Nielsen, 2016). We asked participants to “Please indicate how much you agree with the 
following national policies according to the following scale” followed by a list of the six 
policies. The policies were: “Increasing security in public places, such as shopping malls and 
government buildings;” “Increasing security at critical infrastructure facilities, such as 
commercial nuclear power plants;” “Banning airline passengers from carrying on board any 
luggage, including purses, computers, and briefcases;” “Requiring everyone to carry a national 
ID card and show it to authorities on request;” “Allowing authorities to stop people on the street 
at random to search their possessions, based on suspected affiliation with terrorist 
organizations;” “Allowing authorities to stop people on the street at random to search their 
possessions, based on Middle Eastern ethnicity;” and “Allowing authorities to stop people on the 
street at random to search their possessions, based on having a Muslim name, Muslim religious 
items, or Muslim religious clothing.” A seventh item was added to the six used in previous 
research to reflect opinions regarding the resettlement of Syrian refugees: “Banning refugees 
from Syria or surrounding areas from settling in the United States.” 
 Demographics. The demographic data collected included the same questions asked to 
pilot study participants with two additions: household income and highest educational level. For 
household income, the response options were: a) 0-$19,999, b) $20,000-$34,999, c) $35,000-
$49,999, d) $50,000-$64,999, e) $65,000-$79,999, and f) $80,000+. For highest educational 
level, the response options were a) Some high school, b) High school diploma or equivalent 
(GED), c) Some college, d) Associate’s or technical degree, e) Bachelor’s degree, and f) 
Graduate degree. 
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Procedure. I built the survey using Qualtrics software and sent participants the URL 
after they agreed to participate. After they agreed to the informed consent document, the survey 
presented the participants with the AAQ-II, followed by the first PANAS. Following this, 
participants were taken to a page that informs them of the following: “The following is a news 
clip taken from a CNN broadcast. The video may contain violent material that some may find 
disturbing. You have the option of skipping the video if you do not wish to view the violent 
content and moving to a later part of the survey. Do you wish to view the video or skip it?” 
Participants who chose to view the video were randomly selected to watch one of the three 
videos (the James Holmes trial, mass beheading, or teacher videos). After watching the video, 
participants were given the second PANAS. Then, participants were given the list of security 
policies. Participants who chose to skip the video were sent directly to the list of security 
policies. Then, the demographics questions followed. After finishing the demographics 
questions, the survey debriefed participants and, for the Mechanical Turk workers, gave 
instructions on how to receive compensation. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
Pilot Study 
To test my hypothesis that the James Holmes and mass beheading videos would increase 
negative affect, I calculated negative affect scores by finding the sum of all negative affect words 
in each PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Then, I ran a paired-samples t-test 
comparing negative affect before watching the video and after watching the video. There was a 
significant result in the James Holmes video condition, such that negative affect before viewing 
(M = 15.10, SD = 5.18) was significantly less than negative affect after viewing (M = 21.10, SD 
= 7.16), t(29) = -4.63, p < .001. There was also a significant difference in the mass beheading 
video condition, such that negative affect after watching the video (M = 21.97, SD = 7.70) was 
significantly higher than negative affect before watching the video (M = 16.26, SD = 6.20), t(33) 
= -5.26, p < .001. The results of this analysis are depicted in Table 1. 
Main Study 
 To confirm that the James Holmes and mass beheading videos increased negative affect, 
and the control video did not increase negative affect, I once again calculated negative affect 
change by conducting paired-samples t-tests to compare negative affect after viewing each video 
to negative affect before viewing each video. The results of the analysis are in Table 2. The 
results of this analysis supported my predictions, such that in both the student and online 
samples, the James Holmes and mass beheading videos significantly raised negative affect. The 
neutral teacher video significantly decreased negative affect in the student sample, and did not 
change affect in the online sample. 
 Before examining the study’s questions, I examined the factor structure of those security 
policy scores in both the student and online samples to determine if support for three security 
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policies that relate to Middle Easterners, Muslims, and Syrian refugees represent a single factor 
or multiple factors.  The three security policies were: “Allowing authorities to stop people on the 
street at random to search their possessions, based on Middle Eastern ethnicity,” “Allowing 
authorities to stop people on the street at random to search their possessions, based on having a 
Muslim name, Muslim religious items, or Muslim clothing,” and “Banning refugees from Syria 
or the surrounding areas from settling in the United States.” Based on Kaiser’s (1960) 
recommendation for factor selection of only component scores above a minimum eigenvalue of 
1.0, the analysis resulted in a single factor that accounted for 80.88% of the total variance in the 
three items. The factor loadings for this analysis are reported in Table 3, and the scree plot for 
the Eigenvalues in this analysis is depicted in Figure 2. Consequently, I used SPSS to calculate a 
single factor component score to represent support for prejudicial policies that target Middle 
Easterners, Muslims, and Syrian refugees. 
 In examining Hypothesis 1, I conducted a one-way ANOVA in both the online and 
student samples to compare the effect of video condition on the prejudicial factor component 
score. In the student sample, the results were not significant, F(2, 314) = .16, p > .05. The η² for 
this effect was less than 0.001. In the online sample, the results were also not significant, F(2, 
261) = 1.74, p > .05. The η² for this effect was 0.01. These results do not support the hypothesis 
that viewing the CNN video depicting the ISIS propaganda film significantly increased support 
for prejudicial policies, compared to viewing the other videos. The mean prejudice component 
scores broken down by sample and video condition are displayed in Table 4. 
 To test Hypothesis 2, that inflexibility moderates the relationship between increase in 
negative affect and support for prejudicial policies, a moderation model was analyzing using 
Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro. The analysis was conducted for each video condition and beta 
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weights for direct and conditional effects are depicted in Tables 5, 6, and 7. In Step 1 of each 
model, I entered post-negative affect and inflexibility as predictors along with pre-negative affect 
as a covariate. In Step 2, I added an interaction term (post-negative affect*inflexibility) of post-
negative affect X inflexibility to the previous model. The component score for support for 
prejudicial policies was entered as the dependent variable. 
 For the James Holmes video condition, the predictor variables were not significantly 
related to the dependent variable in either the online or student samples. In addition, the 
interaction term did not significantly increase the variance in the dependent variable. These 
results suggest that the change in affect resulting from watching the video did not change support 
for the anti-Muslim security policies, and inflexibility was not related to this relationship. The 
results for this analysis are depicted in Table 5. 
 For the mass beheading video condition, in both the online and student samples, there 
was a significant main effect at Step 1 for post-negative affect (p < .05) but not for pre-negative 
affect or psychological inflexibility. Adding the interaction term did not significantly increase 
the variance in the dependent variable for either the online or the student samples. In the student 
sample, adding the interaction term resulted in post-negative affect dropping from significance. 
The results for this analysis are depicted in Table 6. 
 For the teacher video condition, in the online sample, there was a significant effect for 
post-negative affect (p < .05) but not for pre-negative affect or psychological inflexibility. In the 
student sample, there were no significant main effects. Adding the interaction term did not 
increase the variance in the dependent variable, and in the online sample, adding the interaction 
term resulted in post-negative affect dropping from significance. The results for this analysis are 
depicted in Table 7. 
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 Therefore, the results of these analyses reveal some evidence that an increase in negative 
affect as a unique result of watching the news broadcast from ISIS resulted in stronger support 
for security policies that target Muslims, Middle Easterners, and Syrian refugees. This 
relationship was not seen in the James Holmes video condition and was only seen in the online 
sample in the teacher video condition. However, the analysis did not support the hypothesis that 
psychological inflexibility moderates this relationship. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 My main hypotheses, that the terrorism video would increase support for prejudicial 
policies and that psychological inflexibility would play a role in this relationship, were not 
supported in either sample. One finding did emerge from the results, however, that viewing 
violent ISIS-related news stories may influence opinions about anti-Muslim security policies 
solely through negative affect. Though I predicted that affect would play a part in this 
relationship, I was incorrect that psychological inflexibility would moderate this relationship.  
 These results seem to suggest that caution is needed when interpreting the role of 
psychological inflexibility in affect-related responses to stimuli in the news and in general 
prejudice. Though psychological inflexibility was implicated in previous research on prejudice, it 
had an effect mainly in conjunction with other variables, specifically low empathic concern for 
others and low perspective-taking ability (Vilardaga et al., 2012). Without examining these other 
two variables, we may have missed their combined effect with inflexibility. Additionally, all 
three variables combined only had a moderate effect on prejudice in previous research, with r = 
.28 (Levin et al., 2015). Therefore, while this study is evidence that inflexibility itself is not 
implicated in reactions to terrorist propaganda, the entire Flexible Connectedness Model of 
prejudice still cannot be dismissed. 
Limitations 
 Several aspects of this study limit the conclusions that may be reached from these data. 
First, the lack of significant findings in this study may be the result of Type II error. The most 
obvious candidate for this error may be sample size: both samples were split between four 
possible conditions (three video conditions plus those who opted out of the video), resulting in 
between 71 and 100 valid participants per video condition. A post-hoc power analysis revealed 
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that power ranged from .54 for the video condition with the smallest sample size, to .98 at the 
largest. The video conditions with the smallest samples may be too low to detect a small or 
medium moderation effect (McClelland & Judd, 1993). 
The nature of the Amazon MTurk survey as a long-distance questionnaire completed on a 
computer may have introduced some possible confounds into the survey process. There was no 
way to ensure that participants’ attention was focused on the survey at all times, particularly 
during the video exposure. The question of the nature and external validity of MTurk samples 
has been examined in political science, and this may speak to the demand characteristics and 
demographic makeup of my MTurk sample (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Previous research has 
determined that in occupation and rural-urban distribution, MTurk respondents mirror other 
types of general population surveying, while MTurk is disproportionately strong in attracting 
young Asians and Hispanics and tends to have some age-related differences in responding 
compared to other methods of population surveying (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Finally, because 
MTurk rewards participants based on completion and not necessarily engagement, it is unclear 
whether the incentive to finish quickly diminished the quality of the responses in the MTurk 
sample. 
Huff and Tingley (2015) also note that, while the rural-urban ratio of respondents is 
roughly equivalent for MTurk and other national sampling methods, it sits at roughly 90% urban 
and 10% rural. By contrast, our undergraduate sample was taken from a predominantly rural 
population at a school in a rural area. However, this should not be taken as a pure urban vs. rural 
comparison, as many students at the university came from urban areas, and rural southeastern 
Georgia may not be representative of every rural area. In particular, access to resources, 
education, and wealth may be significant moderators across rural areas in the United States. 
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Participant characteristics and motivations for both samples may have influenced the 
process of data collection. Allowing participants to opt out of watching the video may have given 
participants an opportunity to shorten the duration of the study. Participants in both groups were 
compensated not based on the duration of their participation but simply on their participation, 
therefore, they may have simply wished to “skip ahead” and receive their compensation more 
quickly. This could be remedied in future research by giving participants who didn’t want to 
watch a graphic video an alternate video of the same duration rather than an opportunity to 
simply skip a section of the study. 
 Additionally, giving participants the opportunity to opt-out of the video was intended to 
ensure that participants were not unwillingly exposed to troubling material. However, this may 
have removed participants with certain characteristics from the video conditions, resulting in a 
weakening of any existing effect. A post-study analysis revealed no significant difference in 
either sample between those who opted out and those who did not in psychological inflexibility 
(p > .05). However, there was a significant difference in negative affect between those who opted 
out and those who did not in the online sample [t(426) = -2.17, p < .05] and the student sample 
[t(443) = -3.18, p < .01], such that in both samples, negative affect was higher in those who 
opted out of watching the video. Additionally, support for prejudicial policies was higher in 
those who opted out of watching the video in the student sample [t(461) = -3.68, p < .001] but 
not in the online sample [t(433) = -1.50, p > .05]. These findings may be interpreted as implying 
that negative affect plays a role in support for prejudicial security policies, consistent with 
Hatton and Nielsen (2016), and suggest future directions for research. 
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 Finally, by the time of data collection, the videos were over one year old. Qualitative data 
taken in later studies (Hatton & Nielsen, 2016b) revealed that many people reported that the 
emotional valence of these particular news stories had diminished due to over-exposure. 
Future Directions 
 Future research can examine more closely the role of negative affect in support for 
national security policies, including those that profile Muslims. The form of the PANAS chosen 
for this study includes 20 emotion words and these break down into global positive and global 
negative affect scores. An examination of the specific emotions that drive support for various 
security policies can be performed. Additionally, other studies can use the PANAS-X, an 
expanded 60-item version of the PANAS that includes factors that make up positive and negative 
affect, including the basic emotions of fear, hostility, guilt, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, and 
attentiveness (Watson & Clark, 1994). 
 While inflexibility did not seem to have any effect on reactions to the ISIS news story, 
this is not the only possible psychological variable that measures behavioral reactivity to 
discomfort. There are two forms of reactivity to distressing stimuli that may bear some role in 
how people respond to news stories depicting violent terrorism: anxiety sensitivity and disgust 
sensitivity. 
Anxiety sensitivity does have some previous research support in terms of predicting 
reactions to distressing media (Collimore, McCabe, Carleton, & Asmundson, 2008). Though 
anxiety sensitivity was not implicated in prejudice in previous studies, it may result in support 
for policies that are prejudicial in certain contexts, particularly those intended to make 
Americans safer. If this is the case, anxiety sensitivity may play the role that psychological 
inflexibility was hypothesized to play in the current study. 
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Disgust sensitivity is hypothesized to play a role in prejudice. Though it is a construct 
developed to measure one’s sensitivity to substances that may be dangerous, noxious, or 
contaminated (Rozin, Haidt, & HcCauley, 2008), some evidence has tied it to negative views 
toward out-groups (Hodson & Costello, 2007) and groups judged to threaten traditional 
standards of religious morality (Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010). On that line of research, 
disgust sensitivity is an evolutionary adaptation that emerged to protect humans from objects, 
substances, and even other humans who may represent carriers of disease or threats to health. 
Thus, disgust sensitivity may predict support for security policies that protect against external 
threats coming from out-groups such as Muslims or terrorists; however, it is unclear whether 
terrorism actually provokes the emotion of disgust. In particular, the gruesome nature of ISIS 
videos may evoke disgust in ways that even other kinds of terrorism do not. 
Additionally, we asked participants to explicitly indicate their emotional feelings toward 
Muslims, using a cold/warm paradigm that had previously been developed in social psychology 
and public research. There may be a way to less explicitly test for prejudice toward Muslims, 
such as using a covert variable, photograph, personal description, or laboratory confederate. 
Experiments testing anti-Muslim prejudice may find more robust prejudice when the variables 
are less subject to desirability bias. 
In conclusion, data from this study suggest that psychological inflexibility as it is 
measured in the AAQ-II does not play a role in moderating reactions to news of terrorist events. 
Although the results did not confirm this hypothesis, this study does raise the possibility that 
future researchers may improve our understanding of people’s reactions to distressing media 
stories by examining the role of anxiety sensitivity, disgust sensitivity, or negative affect. Such 
research may inform our understanding of psychological factors that carry consequences for 
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social policy. This research may also be used to create interventions that decrease the effects of 
terrorism on the public. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Negative Affect Before and After Viewing Pilot Study Videos 
  Pre  Post  Paired Differences t-test 
  M SD  M SD  M SEM df t p 
James Holmes Video  15.10 5.18  21.10 7.16  -6.00 1.29 29 -4.63 <.001 
Mass Beheading Video  16.26 6.20  21.97 7.70  -5.71 1.08 33 -5.26 <.001 
 
Table 2 
Negative Affect Before and After Viewing Main Study Videos 
  Pre- Negative Affect  Post- Negative Affect  t-test 
  M SD  M SD  df t p 
Student Sample           
   James Holmes  16.04 6.31  19.58 7.45  101 -5.36 <.001 
   Mass Beheading  16.98 7.90  21.18 9.15  95 -5.20 <.001 
   Teacher  16.48 7.13  14.30 6.57  101 4.67 <.001 
Online Sample           
   James Holmes   13.97 5.72  18.24 6.58  91 -7.16 <.001 
   Mass Beheading   13.08 5.19  18.60 7.61  89 -6.92 <.001 
   Teacher   13.20 5.86  12.76 5.44  75 .86 .40 
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Table 3 
 
Factor Loadings for Support for Prejudicial Policy Opinions 
Items 
 Factor 1 
Loadings  
 
Allowing authorities to stop people on the street at random to search their 
possessions, based on Middle Eastern ethnicity. 
 
 .946 
 
Allowing authorities to stop people on the street at random to search their 
possessions, based on having a Muslim name, Muslim religious items, or 
Muslim clothing. 
 
 .932 
 
Banning refugees from Syria or the surrounding areas from settling in the 
United States 
 
 .814 
   Eigenvalue  2.426 
   % of Total Variance  80.881 
 
Table 4 
Effect of Video Condition on Mean Prejudicial Factor Score 
 M SD SEM 
Student Sample    
   James Holmes -.12 .95 .09 
   Mass Beheading -.18 .88 .09 
   Teacher -.12 .98 .09 
Online Sample    
   James Holmes  -.02 1.06 .11 
   Mass Beheading  -.17 .93 .10 
   Teacher  .13 1.14 .13 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Support for Prejudicial Policies in James Homes Video 
Group  
 
Online Sample Student Sample 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI 
Predictors         
     Baseline NA .01 [-.04, .06] .00 [-.05, .05] .03 [-.01, .06] .03 [-.01, .03] 
     Post NA .03 [-.01, .07] .03 [-.02, .08] -.01 [-.04, .03] -.01 [-.04, .02] 
     Inflex. -.01 [-.04, .01] -.01 [-.04, .02] .01 [-.01, .03] .01 [-.01, .03] 
Interactions         
     NA x Inflex.   .00 [-.00, .01]   .00 [-.00, .01] 
R2  .05  .06  .04  .10 
Change in R2     .01    .03 
Note: Betas are unstandardized. None of the predictors in this model are significant. Effects 
were rounded to the nearest hundredth and (-) indicates direction. 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Support for Prejudicial Policies in Mass Beheading Video 
Group  
 
Online Sample Student Sample 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI 
Predictors         
     Baseline NA -.02 [-.06, .03] -.02 [-.07, .03] -.02 [-.05, .02] -.01 [-.04, .03] 
     Post NA .05 [.03, .08] .05 [.02, .09] .03 [.00, .05] .03 [-.00, .06] 
     Inflex. -.00 [-.03, .02] -.00 [-.02, .02] .01 [-.02, .03] .01 [-.02, .03] 
Interactions         
     NA x Inflex.   -.00 [-.00, .00]   -.00 
[-.003, 
.001] 
R2  .16  .16  .07  .09 
Change in R2     .00    .01 
Note: Betas are unstandardized. Predictors in bold are significant (p<.05). Effects were 
rounded to the nearest hundredth and (-) indicates direction. 
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Support for Prejudicial Policies in Teacher Video Group  
 
Online Sample Student Sample 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Variables B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI B 95% CI 
Predictors         
     Baseline NA -.03 [-.09, .04] -.04 [-.17, .09] .04 [-.01, .09] .04 [-.02, .09] 
     Post NA .07 [.00, .13] .07 [-.12, .26] .03 [-.01, .08] .01 [-.04, .01] 
     Inflex. .00 [-.03, .03] .00 [-.04, .04] -.02 [-.04, .00] -.02 [-.04, .01] 
Interactions         
     NA x Inflex.   .00 [-.01, .01]   .002 [-.00, .00] 
R2  .07  .12  .17  .22 
Change in R2     .03    .02 
Note: Betas are unstandardized. Predictors in bold are significant (p<.05). Effects were 
rounded to the nearest hundredth and (-) indicates direction. 
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Figure 1 
Proposed Model of Psychological Inflexibility as a Moderator of Reactions to Terrorist Events 
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Figure 2 
Scree Plot of Eigenvalues for Prejudicial Security Policies 
 
 
